Protected areas are one of the most effective tools for nature conservation. 10
Introduction

31
The physical, biological and cultural assets of the planet are unequally divided 32 among more than 200 sovereign countries and dependencies of different legal character. 33
The six largest countries of the world occupy 45% of the land area excluding 34 Antarctica, while the smallest hundred occupy only 2.5% (Gini index, G = 0.80, Table  35 1; data sources are depicted in Table 2 ). Moreover, ten countries exceeding 100 M 36 inhabitants, encompass 60% of the world population, while there are 115 countries with 37 less than 1 M (G = 0.81). This conjunction of conditions clearly implies differential 38 access and appropriation of natural resources by humans, which is reflected and 39 magnified in the gross domestic product (G = 0.87) and in the military expenditure (G = 40 0.90). Perhaps less obvious is that these inequalities together imply different degrees of 41 responsibility on the part of the administrations of countries in the long-term 42 conservation of natural and cultural assets. This makes global sustainability hard to 43 achieve considering that it should be a joint effort which exceeds current and future 44 political borders. 45
The countries with the highest level of wealth were the first to formalize 46 conservation policies under different agreements. With the sanction of the Yellowstone 47 National Park Act in 1872, the United States of America installed the modern concept 48 of protected area at a global level (Watson et al. 2014 ). This legal title entails the 49 effective preservation of large tracts of land, which are later made available for public 50 use. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, other sovereign or colonial governments 51 quickly adopted this model, such as Canada, Chile or South Africa (Szafer 1973 , 52 McNeely et al. 1994 , Watson et al. 2014 . The 20th century brought relevant 53 geopolitical changes, such as the independence of colonial territories and the split of 54 former territories after both World-Wars. In face of these changes, academic circles in 55
Western Europe anticipated a degazettement of protected areas in Africa, Asia and 56
Oceania. Conversely, these new countries actively promoted the creation of protected 57 areas, as conservation was no longer exclusive to powerful countries (Frank et al. 2000 , 58 Fairbrother 2012 . In a few years, peripheral and young countries, such as the Central 59
Methods
134
The data about the size of individual protected areas (in km 2 ) and of the extent of 135 protected areas at a national level (in percentage) were obtained from the World 136 Database on Protected Areas, March 2018 (IUCN and UNEP-WCMC 2018) . We 137 included only protected areas which have been specifically designated for nature 138 protection, i.e., strict nature reserve, wilderness areas, national parks, natural 139 monuments or features, and habitat/species management areas, categorized as I-IV 140 under the IUCN guidelines (1994) . In this database, protected areas in many countries 141 (e.g., Bolivia, South Africa, Comoros) are almost exclusively labeled under the IUCN 142
class "Not Reported", which could lead to an underestimation of their national figures. 143 In this sense, for these countries, we considered previous UNEP-WCMC 144 categorizations (e.g., Bolivia or South Africa in 2013 had many protected areas 145 categorized as I to IV) or included areas labeled with the general designations described 146 above (e.g., national parks) and small variations of them. For those polygons that shared 147 land and sea, we only considered the terrestrial area by subtracting the marine area to 148 the overall GIS area from tabular data ( Figure S1 , Appendix 1). We excluded all 149 protected areas with a "proposed" status. Due to a potential overestimation of national 150 protected extent from overlapping problems (Deguignet et al. 2017) , polygons were 151 dissolved and new individual areas were recalculated using the Mollweide projection. 152
Finally, for countries where polygonal data was partially or completely unavailable (> 153 50% of the units, e.g., Moldova), we included information from point data. After this 154 data manipulation, the total global protected extent was 9.2 M km 2 , which is equivalent 155 to 7.0% of the land surface, divided into approximately 114,000 units. 156
Samples of this study were the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity 157 (CBD) (except for Monaco and the State of Palestine), including 191 countries members 158 of the United Nations, Cook Islands and Niue (both under the Realm of New Zealand), and the United States of America (a United Nations member, but not a CBD party). 160
Non-sovereign territories were excluded from analyses since many of the political 161 decisions that concern their territorial management are held in central government 162
administrations. 163
We related the protected extent at a national level to sixteen independent 164 variables representing cultural drivers ( Table 2 ). The first six variables are associated 165 with the intertwined concepts of size and power of a country. The first variable is 166 Crowards (2002b, a) classification based on non-hierarchical cluster analysis, generated 167 from land area, gross domestic product (GDP) and population. The second, third and 168 fourth variables are the individual land area, GDP and population. We added two more 169 variables to the size and power group, i.e., the military expenditure and the possession 170 of external territories (Baldacchino and Milne 2006, Arvanitidis and Kollias 2016) . The 171 following ten variables are related to general geographical, conservation and socio-172 economic characteristics of countries, and are used to contextualize the strength of 173 variables related to size and power. These ten variables are equal or similar to those 174 used in the global studies of Table 3 , with the exception of the tourism contribution to 175 GDP (variable #13) and whether the countries are continental or insular (variable #15). 176
These last two variables are included as many local studies highlight the role of tourism 177 as a driver of conservation (e.g., Maekawa et al. 2013) , especially on islands (e.g., 178
Sufrauj 2011). Finally, the governance value (variable #12) of Somalia was excluded by 179 considering it as an outlier. All data is available in Appendix 2. 180
With an exclusively exploratory and descriptive purpose, we regressed protected 181 extent (in percentage) to continuous variables by means of a Local Regression (LOESS) 182 method. This non-parametric approach identifies patterns and fits a smoothed curve 183 neither assuming any global function nor estimating a statistical significance of 184 relationships (e.g., via a coefficient of determination) (Cleveland 1979) . For categorical 185 variables, we constructed violin plots, which are similar to box plots with a rotated 186 kernel density plot on each side (Hintze and Nelson 1998) . We also assessed the 187 correlation between continuous variables through a Kendall's τ non-parametric test 188 (Whittaker 1987) . The number of samples that were used for LOESS models (i.e., 189 countries) varied according to data available (from 145 to 195, see Figure 2 ). 190
In order to measure the individual effect of the independent variables, we 191 applied a random forest ensemble learning method (Breiman 2001) , which estimates 192 their importance (variable importance, VI) by looking at how much the mean square 193 error (MSE) increases when the out-of-bag data (OOB) for that variable is permuted 194 while all others are left unchanged (Liaw and Wiener 2002, Grömping 2009). To 195 include all considered countries in the random forest, we filled missing values with the 196 continental averages (5.4% of the values from the combination of 195 countries * 16 197 variables). Following Strobl et al. (2008 Strobl et al. ( , 2009 in comparison with micro-to medium-size countries. Large to very large countries are 289 also mostly affluent, populated and powerful ( Figure 3 ), a conjunction of factors that 290 make them fundamentally responsible for the conservation of nature. As a matter of 291 fact, these countries manage a remarkable amount of natural resources and biodiversity, 292 occupy different continents or hemispheres, possess the material resources to maintain 293 and promote conservation programs, and shape and determine their own and others' 294 economic and political actions with the greatest independence (Neumann and Gstöhl 295 2004, Beckley 2018) . Certainly, every country should make a similar attempt to 296 conserve a fraction of their natural resources (SCBD 2010), as the fulfillment of 297 common goals by small countries ensures the protection of their geographical or 298 biological singularities. However, this legal equality has a political and -essentially-299 ecological counterpart, since an effective growth of the global protected area network 300 depends on larger and more powerful countries which have the actual capacity to 301 generate radical changes at that spatial level. Jenkins and Joppa (2009) stated that the 302 global increase in protected extent during the 2000 decade was accounted for mostly by 303
Brazil's protected area expansion. 304
More than two decades ago, Wells and Williams (1998) pointed out that, with 305 the demise of communism in Russia, the economic resources allocated to conservation 306 sharply declined, with a consequent weakening of law enforcement and an increase in 307 illegal activities in protected areas. Confirming and extending these findings, Watson et 308 al. (2014) suggested that there was significant evidence that more affluent and extensive 309 countries such as Australia, the United States of America or Canada were cutting 310 financial and human resources for the conservation sector, and were even overlooking 311 existing conservation policies and legislation. This has occurred in spite of the strong 312 discourse in these countries towards increasing the size and effectiveness of protected 313 area networks. Several studies endorse our findings by considering the level of 314 anthropization of protected areas (Leroux et al. 2010 , Jones et al. 2018 , the specific 315 efforts in the conservation of a taxon (Lindsey et al. 2017), or even the attitudes of the 316 population (Nawrotzki 2012). By means of social surveys, Nawrotzki (2012) stated in 317 fact that the strongest opposition toward environmental protection was observed in 318 conservative people of more powerful, capitalist countries, while in peripheral, less 319 developed ones, conservative people were more environmentally friendly than liberal 320 ones. 321
This differential effort emerges so markedly that it is interesting to return to a 322 selective and meaningful comparison between extreme cases. If Russia and the United 323
States of America sought to repeat the examples of Liechtenstein and São Tomé and 324
Príncipe, respectively, their protected area network would need to incorporate 1.4 M 325 km 2 and 2.0 M km 2 , respectively, to their current networks. In this speculative exercise, 326 the inclusion of these 3.4 M km 2 would increase the global protected extent by 2.6%, 327 from 7.0% to 9.6% under I-IV categories under IUCN guidelines (1994) . If we extend 328 comparisons to the size of the largest protected area ( Figure 5 i.e., that wealthy countries have protected areas of smaller size than poorer countries. 333
Comparisons can be considered at some point unlikely due to the deep economic and 334 social implications that Russia and the United States of America (as well as other 335 countries like China or Indonesia) would have to face in light of a different territorial 336 order. However, comparisons stress that some small to medium-sized countries have 337 decided to follow conservation-prone spatial planning without many -at least financial-338 apparent difficulties. Renowned Bhutan's conservation efforts exceed protected areas, as 339 the constitution mandates that at least 60% of the country must remain with its natural 340 forest cover, while the government has committed to remaining carbon neutral 341 (Wangchuk 2007 , Lham et al. 2019 Turning back to the Aichi agreements, the debt held by the largest or most 343 powerful countries is enlarged by considering the second clause of Target 11 (SCBD 344 2010), which sets that protected networks have to sample all natural conditions and all 345 levels of life organization with the same effort. According to Barr et al. (2011) prevailed in the random forest ranking (Figure 4 ). In fact, Kashwan (2017) found a 369 strong interaction between income inequality and the system of government: When 370 democracy prevailed, inequality led to less protection, whereas when totalitarianism did, 371 inequality led to more protection. 372
Including income inequality and other variables in these analyses was aimed at 373 contextualizing the importance of size and power drivers. From these, the one that 374 reached the greatest importance turned out to be military expenditure (third position), 375 followed by land area (eighth position, with values similar to globalization and 376 governance), and GDP, population size and external possessions in ninth, tenth and 377 eleventh positions, respectively ( Figure 4 ). Regardless of the position in the ranking, the 378 question about which direct or indirect mechanisms explain the effect of size and power 379 remain unanswered. Having stated this, the empirical knowledge generated in this and 380 previous studies (see Table 3 ) provides evidence to propose the following a posteriori by the land area of a country through a sampling effect (except those occupying extreme 400 deserts) (Freudenberger et al. 2012) . In this regard, the larger the country is (in terms of 401 land area), the greater the redundancy of diverse natural resources will be. Given this 402 redundancy, larger countries would allocate a small fraction of their territories to 403 conservation in order to achieve the representation goals. Complementarily, smaller 404 countries would allocate a large fraction of their territories in order to maintain their 405 natural system, ensuring the provision of varied resources or services and the 406 achievement of representation goals. 407 (#4) Given the interaction between the aspects associated with an economy of 408 scale (hypothesis #1) and a limited diversity of resources (hypothesis #3), the economic 409 viability of smaller and less powerful countries (in terms of land area, population, GDP) 410 would be conditioned by non-extractive or unconventional industries, such as tourism in 411 tropical islands (Croes 2013). In this regard, the smaller and less powerful is the 412 country, the tourism industry would be boosted by the creation of infrastructure and the 413 maintenance of landscape quality and biological diversity in protected areas. 414
Considering the results depicted in Figures 1 and 2a -f, the mechanism that 415 supports the first of the four hypotheses would not prevail, since even countries with a 416 very low population maintain extensive protected area systems (e.g., Iceland, Mongolia, 417 Namibia) (Figure 2d ,j). The other three hypotheses could advocate mechanisms that 418 have effective implications for conservation, although these have received mixed 419 support from our results. As an example, we found that the highly correlated 420 governance-globalization drivers (Figure 3 protected area systems (e.g., Cambodia, Malta), or cannot (e.g., Georgia, Maldives). 429
Other less explored factors, such as the closeness to natural environments, the 430 social sense of belonging, cohesion or self-sufficiency, as well as the degradation, 431 scarcity or finitude of natural resources in resource-constrained environments, could 432 support the thesis of a greater conservation effort in smaller or less powerful countries 433 (Aguilera-Klink et al. 2000 , McNeely 2015 . Oceanic islands could be used to test these 434 ideas, as they frequently maintain well-organized strategies of land management due to 435 their high environmental, demographic, and economic vulnerabilities (Pelling and Uitto 436 2001, Christensen and Mertz 2010) . We find that the condition of insularity (second in 437 the importance ranking) could support these postulates since violin plots in Figure 2o 438 suggest that protection in insular countries is larger than that in continental countries. 439
Our results could be used to unfold conservation scenarios in the face of 440 geopolitical changes, specifically in relation to the number and size of countries. Finally, we should highlight some caveats of the paper. First, the land area could 455 be intuitively considered a geographical -more than a cultural-trait. However, as stated 456 by Alesina (2003), the land area would not be necessarily a factor external to a country's 457 culture, as the same culture could determine this merely geographical feature. Second, 458
we have exclusively evaluated the relationships of each current cultural driver and the 459 
Conclusions
470
The commitment of countries to nature conservation, specifically through the 471 deployment of protected areas, showed to be greatly uneven among countries, from 472 those which completely devoid of this legal figure to those in which nearly half of the 473 territory is strictly protected. These differences would obey to the interaction of several 474 underlying and direct cultural drivers. Previous studies that observe these relationships 475 excluded countries of small size, sparsely populated, recently conformed or of insular 476 character, omitting thus extreme and deviant geographical or cultural cases. Meanwhile, 477 until now the size and power of a country as a driver of the protected extent of a country 478 had not been explored. We intended to amend both situations, finding that the largest or 479 most powerful countries have made a lower conservation effort than the smaller or less 480 powerful ones. Size and power would mediate individual or joint effect of other drivers 481 or would act directly as a mechanism by allowing, for example, stronger countries to impose policies over weaker countries or by abstaining to participate (the stronger) 483 countries in international agreements. 484
Regardless of these points, the largest and most powerful countries are the ones 485 that have the greatest responsibility in nature protection, given that internal changes in 486 their conservation policies aimed at increasing the extension and financing their 487 protected areas imply the success of the global conservation of nature. Perhaps a more 488 plausible conclusion about the differences among countries is that the larger and more 489 powerful ones protect less, not because they cannot do better, but because it is not part 490 of their political agendas. Paraphrasing Lewis and Wigen (1997) 2.7 x 10 4 1.6 x 10 7 0.87
